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1. Introduction 
The object of this article is to develop the point that the problems associated with 
contractual holdup may justify legal intervention in theory and to relate this conclusion to 
legal intervention in practice, in the form of the voiding of certain contracts and the 
cabining of price.  
The term “contractual holdup” is employed here in a standard way; it refers to 
situations in which a party to a new or an existing contract accedes to a very 
disadvantageous demand due to the party’s being in a circumstance of substantial need.
1 
Stock examples of contractual holdup concern property owners who experience pressing 
liquidity problems or who are even physically threatened (almost a literal holdup), 
businesses with immediate requirements for specific goods or services, parties to 
contracts who face the prospect of breach at critical junctures, individuals whose cars 
break down and desire tows, and ships in distress.  
The difficulties that contractual holdup engenders are ones of incentives and risk-
bearing and are reviewed in section 2. As is generally appreciated, the possibility of 
holdup leads to a range of undesirable incentives: wasteful efforts to engage in holdup 
(arranging a threat of violence, using a needlessly expensive construction method with 
which others are unfamiliar in order to make a midstream threat of breach); inefficient 
precautions to avoid holdup (purchasing a reserve engine for a ship even though rescue 
would be likely and cheap to effect); dulled investment motives (reducing advertising of 
a television because the show’s profits may be extorted by the cast in renegotiations). 
Holdup prices may also represent a significant risk (suppose that a tugboat could obtain 
an agreement for half the value of a vessel for towing it to safe harbor).   
How the law can alleviate the undesirable consequences of contractual holdup is 
addressed in section 3. One approach is for the law simply to void contracts or their 
modifications when made in certain circumstances, since that will remove the prospect of 
profit from holdup. This policy may be desirable when the events that permit holdup to 
occur are engineered in some fashion (the threat of violence, the needlessly expensive 
construction method), for these events would not have been instigated if they would not 
have resulted in enforceable contracts. When, however, situations of need are not 
engineered (bad weather puts a ship in jeopardy, market forces cause construction costs 
to increase), flat voiding of agreements is clearly undesirable, since in such situations 
contracts for aid or modifications (to tow a ship, to continue with construction) are often, 
                                                 
1 The word “holdup” may first have been used in roughly this sense in the economics literature by 
Goldberg (1976), p. 439. It has also been mentioned by legal academics, for example, by Corbin (1963), 
1A, p.105, in his treatise on contracts. 
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if not typically, socially beneficial. In these circumstances, the policy of controlling the 
contract price is preferable, as that policy can reduce the problems of holdup but still 
allow contracts to be made. Administering a policy of price control, though, involves 
costs and a potential difficulty: because the information of courts or regulators is likely to 
be imperfect, the price that is employed could be mistakenly constraining and chill 
desirable contracts (if the ceiling on the price for rescue at sea is too low, the task may 
not be worth a salvor’s while). In view of these problems, it may be best for legal 
intervention to be restricted in scope, limited to problems of holdup surpassing a 
threshold of seriousness. 
Both types of legal intervention in contracts and their modifications – voiding 
without regard to price and control of price – are used by courts to counter problems of 
pronounced holdup, as is described in section 4. Moreover, what is observed seems 
consistent with economic logic in its broad qualitative aspects. In particular, voiding 
regardless of price tends to be the legal policy when situations of need are engineered or 
something close to that, and price-conditioned voiding is often the legal policy otherwise. 
Under price-conditioned voiding, a contract is voided if its price exceeds a fair level 
(rather than the price being adjusted to the fair level); this is a primary way in which price 
control is effected by courts (although sometimes the policy is implicit). The voiding of 
contracts under contract law is achieved mainly through the doctrines of duress, bad faith, 
and unconscionability, and if a court replaces an agreed contract price with another price, 
it is often as a result of the use of restitutionary principles. Admiralty law doctrine also 
illustrates (in almost expressly economic terms) the control of contract price in the face of 
serious holdup.  
Not only do courts intervene in contracts to remedy substantial problems of 
holdup, various price control regulations appear to serve the same objective, at least in 
part. For instance, as section 4 notes, maximum price ordinances for car towing services 
and requirements that hotels post undiscounted prices prevent holdup, among their 
purposes, as did the historically important rule of laesio enormis, which generally limited 
the magnitude of deviations from market prices during the Middle Ages. Regulation that 
sets price rather than just places a ceiling on price also can prevent holdup. Two 
examples that are discussed concern taxi rate regulation and emergency price regulation. 
But such regulation has the problematic feature that it prevents variation of price due to 
overall market forces.   
A number of issues relating to the foregoing analysis of holdup and the law are 
addressed in the concluding section 5. Among these is that legal intervention in fresh 
contracts to prevent holdup may be interpreted as a response to the inability of parties to 
have contracted at an earlier time, for had they done so, they would have agreed to 
restrain problems of holdup. An example is mentioned in which something like ex ante 
contracting to combat holdup does occur – members of the American Automobile 
Association effectively contract in advance with towing services to obtain help in 
emergencies.  
Also considered is the extensive economic literature on contracting and holdup.
2 
This literature has focused on holdup in the context of modification of contracts rather 
                                                 
2 By “economics literature” I refer to writing in mainstream economics (as opposed to writing in 
law and economics journals and in law reviews). See, for example, the textbook treatment of Bolton and 
Dewatripont (2005), chs. 11-12, Hart (1995), chs. 1-2, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), the January, 
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than fresh contracts and has generally presumed that the law routinely enforces 
modifications (courts have been assumed to lack the information needed to intervene). In 
regard to contractually-specified mechanisms that would govern renegotiation and might 
function as a remedy for holdup problems, two points are observed: that such 
mechanisms possibly can be made legally enforceable; but that there is little evidence 
that contracting parties actually do attempt to use mechanisms to control renegotiation.  
The main contribution of this article to prior economic writing on holdup is that it 
identifies the basic point that legal intervention in contracts to alleviate holdup problems 
may be desirable in theory and that legal intervention occurs in practice in a way that 
roughly comports with theory. In the law and economics literature, legal intervention in 
contracts when holdup occurs has been examined by a number of writers,
3 but they do not 
emphasize that it may make economic sense for the law to control price (rather than just 
to void contracts).
4   
 
2. Contractual Holdup and the Problems it Creates 
  For purposes of discussion, it will be useful to list a number of examples of 
holdup (others will be mentioned below). 
***   
 (a)  In  Baker v. Morton, Baker was induced to sign over his land to another person 
for free because of threats made by an organization known as the Omaha Claim Club, 
operating in the then territory of Nebraska.
5 The tactics of the club included taking a 
landowner who refused to sell his property to the Missouri River and, with a rope tied 
around his neck, repeatedly dunking him until he complied. 
(b) A construction company made a contract to build a factory for a manufacturer 
and used a method which was more expensive than needed for the job and with which 
other construction companies did not have experience. Half way through construction, 
the company threatened breach unless the contract price was modified and raised 
substantially, and the manufacturer agreed.
6
  (c) On the afternoon of December 31
st, a fairly large restaurant in a small town 
found that its electricity had failed due to a wiring problem. Without electricity, the 
restaurant would be unable to operate that evening, normally its most profitable of the 
year. The single electrician in town demanded and received payment of $2,000 for the 
one hour repair job, for which his normal rate would have been $80. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1999, special issue on contracts of the Review of Economic Studies, Williamson (1985), and other 
references cited in section 5.  
  
3 See Aivazian, et al. (1984), Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2004, 2005), Graham and Peirce (1989), 
Johnston (1993), Muris (1981), Posner (1977), Trebilcock (1995), and notes 23, 24, 27, and 60 below.   
 
4 However, Craswell (1995), who examines holdup and enforcement of contracts from a non-
economic perspective, insightfully observes that a price-conditioned voiding policy may lead to the making 
of contracts at fair rather than high prices. 
 
5 79 U.S. 150 (1870). 
 
6 This is a hypothetical example, as will be some others. 
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 (d)  In  Beckwith v. Frisbie, Beckwith, a farmer, hired Frisbie, a canal boat owner, 
to transport oats to New York during the winter.
7 It happened that Frisbie’s boat froze in 
place in the canal and that the oats on board had to be stored to protect them, at a cost to 
Frisbie. Frisbie refused to release the oats unless he was paid more than initially agreed, 
and more than was needed to compensate him for the cost of storing the oats. Beckwith 
complied with Frisbie’s demand in order to recover and sell his oats, at a time when the 
market price of oats was falling. 
 (e)  In  Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. National Oil Transport Co., a towboat came 
upon a barge in a helpless and endangered position.
8 The towboat master obtained an 
agreement to be paid $15,000 for a tow of about one day, under weather conditions that 
were not dangerous, and when normal daily towage rates ranged from $500 to $600. 
 (f)  In  Alaska Packers’ Association v. Delmonico, the crew of a fishing vessel 
demanded and obtained a contract modification under which their wage was doubled, 
from $50 to $100 for the summer.
9 The fishermen had threatened to quit otherwise, and it 
is said that it would have been impossible for them to be replaced because they were in a 
remote location in Alaska and the salmon fishing season was short and about to begin.
10
  (g) James Gandolfini, star of the hit television series, The Sopranos, threatened to 
stop filming new episodes unless his contract with HBO was renegotiated for a 
significantly higher amount than the $400,000 per episode that he had been receiving. 
HBO agreed to an increase, purportedly bringing Gandolfini’s per episode payment to 
over $800,000.
11  
***    
At the outset, we should comment on how it is that holdup occurs, that is, on what 
gives the threatening party, whom we will often call a “contractor,” bargaining power 
over the other party, whom we will often call a “victim.”
12 This is a relatively 
                                                 
7 32 Vt. 559 (1859). 
 
8 286 F. 40 (5th Cir. 1923).  
 
9 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
  
10 Although this paragraph summarizes the facts of the case as seen by the court and as regarded 
by commentators, a recent article, Threedy (2000), offers another interpretation, suggesting that the crew 
might have had valid complaints and that Alaska Packers would not have suffered much had the crew not 
caught any salmon. Among other things, Alaska Packers might not have wanted to catch more salmon – 
there was a surfeit of it; Alaska Packers could probably have purchased more salmon from Indians or from 
other cannery owners; its main purpose in hiring a crew may have been to transport its canned salmon back 
to San Francisco. I will, however, make the conventional assumptions about the case.  
  
11 Gandolfini made his threat in early March, 2003, before the filming of the fifth season of The 
Sopranos, and a reached a settlement later in the month with HBO. See CNN, “Soprano’s Kingpin Set for 
Raise,” March 18, 2003, at www.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/TV/03/18/television.sopranos.reut and E-
Online, “’Sopranos’ back to Shady Business,” March 19, 2003, at 
www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,11470,00.html.
 
12 This terminology will be employed even though a “victim” might not find himself in a situation 
of need, or if he does, might not meet with a contractor, or if he does meet with a contractor, might not be 
held up.  
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straightforward matter in regard to a fresh contract in a case like that of the electrician or 
in a case of rescue like that in Magnolia Petroleum. In such cases, there is a great need 
for a service or good that cannot readily be supplied by a party other than the contractor, 
who can simply choose not to transact. In a situation like that of Baker v. Morton, 
however, the threat is to injure the victim, which is a crime, so how is it that the threat 
may have credibility? In Baker v. Morton the apparent answer is that committing a crime 
might well not have exposed the Omaha Claim Club to real penalty due to its power in 
the Nebraska territory,
13 and in other cases in which the threat is a crime or a tort, one 
often finds a reason for believing that law enforcement would not have been likely.
14 In 
cases where modifications of contracts are at issue, a party threatening breach would, if 
breach were committed, have to pay damages, and the usual measure of damages is the 
expectation measure, making the victim whole. Hence, one might ask why, for example, 
in Alaska Packers or The Sopranos cases, the threatened party agreed to a change in the 
contract terms. One part of the answer may concern inability of the threatening party to 
pay damages; it is doubtful that the crew of the fishing boat had much in assets and could 
pay damages,
15 and one wonders also if Gandolfini possessed holdings nearly sufficient 
to pay HBO for its claimed losses from a breach, perhaps $100 million.
16 Closely related, 
damages are sometimes difficult to calculate, and as judicially determined would be 
significantly less than the victim’s loss from breach. Another part of the explanation may 
be that the party threatening breach may make a counterclaim in order to inject 
uncertainty into the ability of the victim of the threat to collect damages.
17   
Let us now discuss briefly the types of problem that contractual holdup can create.  
The reader may want to bear in mind a simple model with the following characteristics.
18 
Victims may find themselves in situations of need, that is, circumstances in which they 
                                                 
13 The opinion states on p. 150 that “The club made laws and promulgated decrees to suit its purposes, 
and enforced their observance with revolvers, guns, bayonets, ropes, and other appliances.... The sheriff of the 
county, secretary of the Territory, mayor of the city, and register and receiver of the land office, all held high 
positions in the club.”   
 
14 For example, in Barton v. Armstrong, 3 A.L.R. 355 (Privy Council 1973), Armstrong threatened 
to kill a business associate unless he signed an agreement Armstrong wanted. Armstrong’s statements were 
oral, sometimes veiled, sometimes made anonymously in late night telephone calls, and included the threat 
to hire a hit man, such that Barton could reasonably believe that Armstrong might think he could get away 
with murder.   
  
15 The opinion states on p. 102 that “it is quite probable...that they [the crew] may have been 
unable to respond in damages.” 
 
16 See E-Online, “’Sopranos’ back to Shady Business,” March 19, 2003, at 
www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,11470,00.html.
 
17 In Alaska Packers, the crew asserted that the nets on the fishing vessel were in poor repair 
(which would compromise the ability of a crew member to earn incentive payments of two cents per 
salmon caught). In The Sopranos matter, Gandolfini asserted that HBO had violated an element of 
California labor law; see E-Online, “HBO Puts Hit on Gandolfini,” March 11, 2003, at 
www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,11420,00.html.
 
18 This model concerns fresh contracts and a formal version of it is set out below; a similar model 
would apply to contract modification.  
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will suffer a loss unless given aid by a contractor. Various actions of the parties may 
affect the probability of situations of need arising, the probability that a victim in a 
situation of need will come into contact with a contractor, the cost of giving aid, and the 
loss that the victim would suffer in the absence of aid. The cost of aid is presumed to be 
less than the loss a victim in a situation of need would suffer, so that a victim and a 
contractor will have a reason to contract. At most one contractor will be available to 
furnish aid to a victim – bilateral monopoly is assumed – and bargaining will result in the 
contractor obtaining a positive fraction of the surplus from a contract. For concreteness, 
the contractor’s fraction of the surplus may be supposed to be substantial, so that we will 
refer to the contract price as a holdup price. The social objective is the minimization of 
social costs: the sum of the costs of any efforts made prior to the occurrence of situations 
of need, the costs of furnishing aid in situations of need, losses sustained in situations of 
need, together with risk-bearing costs where parties are risk-averse.  
One problem with holdup is that it can lead contractors to invest effort to create 
situations of need. Clearly, any such effort is socially undesirable, because it is costly in 
itself and can only increase subsequent social costs. But the promise of contractor profit 
from the charging of holdup prices may lead contractors to make efforts to engineer 
situations of need. This is obviously illustrated by the case of Baker v. Morton, since the 
Omaha Claim Club invested energy in dragging Baker to the Missouri River to 
demonstrate the reality of its threat and in other ways devoted resources to its extractive 
activities. The phenomenon is also illustrated (in an empirically more relevant way) by 
example (b), where the construction company decided to use an expensive method not 
because it would yield a better outcome but rather because it would allow the 
construction company to hold up the victim, since other construction companies would 
lack the knowledge to complete the job using the method. 
A second problem with holdup is that it can lead victims to expend excessive 
effort toward reducing the likelihood of holdup or its consequences. The degree to which 
victims will exert effort will depend on their desire to avoid paying the holdup price, for 
that is the private cost to them of holdup. To the extent that this price exceeds the actual 
cost of aid, victims will be led to spend too much from a social perspective protecting 
themselves against holdup. Illustrating this possibility of wasteful expenditure would be 
Baker hiring armed guards to thwart the Omaha Claim Club, the restaurant in example (c) 
spending on a backup electrical system or on its own electrician, or the barge in Magnolia 
Petroleum outfitting itself with a spare engine.
19  
A third problem with holdup is that it can dilute victims’ incentives to invest in 
their enterprises. If the holdup price is, as we have assumed, a significant fraction of the 
surplus from aid in a situation of need, then holdup constitutes a form of tax on the fruits 
of investment and dulls the incentive to invest. For instance, we might find that Baker 
would not improve his property in Nebraska, say by putting up a barn, if the value of the 
barn would be extracted from him in his transaction with the Omaha Claim Club (or if his 
having the barn would make him a more likely target of the Club). Likewise, the ship 
owner in Alaska Packers might decide not to install greater storage capacity for salmon if 
the owner felt that that would only accentuate the demands of the crew were it to threaten 
                                                 
19 The spare engine might not be socially justified if rescue by a tugboat would be fairly likely and 
its cost would be modest (such as $500 to $600) compared to a holdup price (such as $15,000).   
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breach; or HBO might decide not to promote The Sopranos as much as would maximize 
total profits because of the possibility of extraction of profits by Gandolfini and other cast 
members. 
A fourth issue relating to holdup is of a different character: contractors’ incentives 
to search for victims in situations of need, and to make related investments, will be closer 
to the desirable level the higher the price they obtain. For a tugboat’s incentives to engage 
in search, or to purchase equipment to lower the cost of towing, to be optimal, the tugboat 
would need to receive the full surplus from giving aid, not just a fraction of it. Hence, 
high holdup prices have a socially beneficial aspect rather than a detrimental one. 
A fifth consideration, however, is that holdup prices impose a form of risk on 
victims. To the degree that victims are risk averse and that holdup prices are high in 
relation to their assets, holdup results in risk-bearing losses.
20 Such risk-bearing losses are 
important in a case like that of Baker v. Morton, since Baker was forced to give up his 
property for nothing, and perhaps would also be in a case like Magnolia Petroleum if the 
barge had been owned by a single individual.
21
From the foregoing, one can see that holdup creates several types of incentive 
problems and a possible problem of risk-bearing, but also has a possible desirable 
incentive effect on contractor search and investment. 
***   
The issue of holdup will be considered formally only for new contracts for 
simplicity, using two versions of the model described informally above. Assume that 
victims and contractors might meet when victims are in situations of need and, for 
convenience, that they are risk-neutral. If a victim in a situation of need meets a 
contractor, the latter can furnish aid and save the victim from suffering harm at a cost less 
than the harm; otherwise the victim will suffer harm. Let  
p = probability that a victim finds himself in a situation of need; 
q = probability that a contractor meets with, and thus may contract with, a victim, 
given that he is in a situation of need; 
c = cost to a contractor of giving aid to a victim in a situation of need, thereby 
preventing harm; 
           h  = harm sustained by a victim in a situation of need if he is not given aid; 
The probabilities p and q may be functions of the effort levels of victims and contractors, 
as will be discussed below. The cost c is assumed to be less than h, and c is assumed to be 
the same for all contractors and h the same for all victims. 
  The social objective is to minimize total expected social costs, the costs of effort 
(to be described), of aid, and of harm suffered. 
  If a contractor and victim in a situation of need meet, it is assumed that their 
information is symmetric and that they make a contract in which the contractor obtains a 
positive fraction of the surplus. Let 
  8 = fraction of the surplus from a contract obtained by the contractor. 
                                                 
20 In strict logic, high holdup prices are also associated with risk-bearing for risk-averse 
contractors, in the sense that they would prefer a certain profit equal to the expected profit they 
probabilistically obtain from high holdup prices. 
 
21 Although the problems of holdup just described are those on which this article will focus, there 
are others. For example, the ability to engage in holdup may raise the cost of bargaining.  
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Since the surplus from a contract is (h – c), the contract price will be c + 8(h – c). 
  Contractors engineer situations of need. Here assume contractors can raise the 
likelihood of situations of need and that victims can reduce it. Specifically, let 
x = effort level of a victim; 
y = effort level of a contractor;  
and suppose that p = p(x, y), where px < 0, pxx > 0 when p is positive, where py > 0, pyy < 
0 when p is less than 1, and where p(x, 0) = 0. Assume also that x and y are chosen before 
situations of need might arise. 
  The first-best level of social costs S is obtained by minimizing 
(1)    S(x, y) = x + y + p(x, y)[qc + (1 – q)h]                            
over x and y, since it is optimal for aid to be given whenever a contractor meets a victim. 
This expression is minimized at x* = 0 and y* = 0, in which case S(0, 0) = 0, for p is 0 
when y is 0. (Here and below, * designates first-best levels of variables.) 
  The Nash equilibrium behavior of parties is described as follows. A victim 
chooses x to minimize 
(2)      x + p(x, y)[q(c + 8(h – c)) + (1 – q)h], 
so, if x is positive, it satisfies 
(3)      1 = –px(x, y)[q(c + 8(h – c)) + (1 – q)h]. 
A contractor chooses y to maximize 
(4)      p(x, y)[q8(h – c)] – y, 
so, if y is positive, it satisfies 
(5)     1 =  py(x, y)[q8(h – c)]. 
Assume for simplicity that the equilibrium, denoted (x(8), y(8)) is uniquely determined 
by 8. In general, not only is y(8) positive for 8 sufficiently high, but because of that, x(8) 
is also positive, making S positive rather than 0. 
  Contractors search for victims in situations of need. Suppose now that contractor 
effort raises the probability that they will locate victims in situations of need and that 
victim effort again reduces the probability of situations of need.
22 Thus, assume that q = 
q(y), where qN(y) > 0 and qO (y) < 0 when q is less than 1, and that p = p(x), where pN(x) < 
0 and pO (x) > 0 when p is positive. 
The first-best level of social costs is obtained by minimizing 
(6)   S(x, y) = x + y + p(x)[q(y)c + (1 – q(y))h] 
over x and y. Assuming that they are positive, the optimal values x* and y* satisfy 
(7)     1 = –pN(x)[q(y)c + (1 – q(y))h], 
(8)     1 =  p(x)[qN(y)(h – c)].   
  Regarding the equilibrium behavior of parties, a victim selects x to minimize  
(9)     x + p(x)[q(y)(c + 8(h – c)) + (1 – q(y))h], 
so, if x is positive, it satisfies  
(10)   1  =  – pN(x)[q(y)(c + 8(h – c)) + (1 – q(y))h] = 0. 
Comparing this to (7), one can see that since bracketed term includes q(y)8(h – c), x is 
socially excessive given y, and the more so the greater is 8. A contractor chooses y to 
maximize  
(11)   p(x)[q(y)8(h – c)] – y, 
                                                 
22 This model is a version of that in Landes and Posner (1978). 
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so, if y is positive, it satisfies 
(12)   1 =  p(x)[qN(y)8(h – c)]. 
Comparing this to (8), it is apparent that when 8 < 1, y is socially inadequate given x, and 
the more so the lower is 8. Again, denote the equilibrium values of x and y by x(8) and 
y(8). 
 
3. Legal Intervention to Remedy Contractual Holdup Problems: In Theory 
  Having discussed the problems generated by contractual holdup, let us now 
examine how in principle legal intervention can alleviate these problems.
23   
Consider first situations in which holdup is engineered by contractors, such as in 
Baker v. Morton, the construction company example (b), and Beckwith v. Frisbie.  
Because any effort devoted to creating situations of need is a social waste, it would be 
best to eliminate the incentive to engage in such effort. That can be accomplished if the 
court voids contracts in which positive effort was devoted to creating situations of need. 
An effort to organize a threat to drown a person like Baker will not be made if any 
resulting contract for sale of property would not be enforced; a company will not employ 
uncalled for construction methods if a modification it obtains as a consequence would not 
be enforced; and a transporter like Frisbie would not refuse to release oats if this could 
not allow it to obtain an enforceable increase in price.
24 Implementing a voiding policy 
when situations of need are engineered of course requires a court to be able to recognize 
such situations.
25  
Now consider contexts in which holdup is not engineered by contractors, and in 
which it is ordinarily desirable for contracts for aid to be made when contractors 
encounter victims in need. Here, as explained in section 2, high prices create incentive 
problems for victims and impose risk on them, but also create beneficial incentives for 
contractors. 
Thus, as a general matter there will be an optimal price, impounding some of the 
contractual surplus, that will best resolve the problems of holdup and the potential 
contractor incentive benefit of a high price. The magnitude of this optimal price, and how 
much it exceeds the usual market price, will depend on the particulars of the context. 
Consider the issue of provision of contractor incentives, which would raise the optimal 
price. This would presumably be a significant factor for maritime rescue by professional 
salvors, especially if conducted in dangerous conditions, since these rescuers need a 
financial motive to search and invest in vessels and equipment. But it is not obvious that, 
                                                 
23 The general point that legal intervention can remedy the incentive problems due to holdup is to 
my knowledge first developed in perceptive articles by Muris (1981) and Aivazian, et al. (1984), focusing 
on contract modifications (as opposed to fresh contracts). They do not analyze the main issue taken up 
here: legal intervention in the form of flat voiding of contracts versus intervention based on price.  
  
24 This observation, that individuals will not engineer situations in which they can engage in 
contractual holdup if their contracts would be voided, has been mentioned before, for example by Bar-Gill 
and Ben-Shahar (2005), sec. 1E, Craswell (1995), pp. 215-218, and Shavell (2004), p. 335. 
 
25 One can imagine difficulties in determining if this were true. For instance, in example (b), the 
construction company might be thought by the court to have had a legitimate economic reason to use the 
expensive method, even though that is not true. If such informational problems are likely, the voiding 
policy under discussion might be inferior to a price-conditioned voiding policy (to be discussed below).  
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for instance, electricians need such incentives, for if a person needs an electrician, the 
person can usually just contact him.
26 Or consider risk aversion, which would call for a 
lower price the stronger the victim’s aversion to risk and the greater the price in relation 
to a victim’s wealth. Risk aversion might be quite relevant in regard to a rescue price 
equal to half a fishing vessel’s value, where the vessel is the chief and only asset owned 
by a fisherman, but risk aversion would not be relevant in regard to a $2,000 price paid 
by a hotel that is part of a large, national chain of hotels.  
Given the optimal price, legal intervention to control price and prevent it from 
exceeding the optimal price may be desirable (ignoring for the moment the difficulties 
and cost of legal intervention). Legal intervention can be undertaken by the courts, on the 
basis of ex post consideration of contractual disputes. One way that this can be 
accomplished is by judicial price control – by a court replacing a contract price that 
exceeds the optimal price with a price equal to the optimal price, but otherwise enforcing 
the contract. Another policy that is effectively equivalent is price-conditioned voiding of 
contracts, under which, as was noted earlier, a court would void a contract if the price 
exceeded the optimal price (rather than replace the price with the optimal price). Once 
parties learn that this policy is in place, they will not set a price exceeding the optimal 
price, since they will know it would not be enforceable. Under both of these judicial 
policies, the price would equal the optimal price if the unconstrained contract price would 
be larger than the optimal price.
27
Legal intervention can also be of an ex ante nature, effected through regulation 
that controls price. This form of intervention will generally be inferior to ex post, judicial 
intervention (continuing to set aside considerations of cost) if the ex ante regulation of 
price does not depend on the contractual environment in individual cases.
28   
                                                 
26 An electrician might, however, need an incentive to monitor phone calls on weekends or after 
hours; and ships in distress could, if they had working radios and were not in imminent peril, solicit bids for 
help (as happened in The Elfrida, as will be noted below). Thus, the comparison between the electrician 
and the salvor is not necessarily as clear as is suggested in the text. 
 
27 The point just discussed, that when holdup is not engineered, legal intervention that controls 
price can alleviate the incentive and risk-bearing problems due to holdup, is, as has been stated, one of the 
main contributions of this article. Graham and Peirce (1989) and Johnston (1993) also consider judicial 
control of price, but in their analysis, price control has a different role from that here. Their models do not 
focus on holdup-related ex ante incentives or risk-bearing but rather on asymmetric information between 
the parties and the consequent possibility of failure to make ex post efficient agreements; price control in 
their models reduces the problem of inefficient failure to modify contracts or of inefficient costly litigation. 
Additionally, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2004) comment on the possibility that courts could control price in 
their basic analysis, but price control has no holdup-connected advantage there; for it is optimal in their 
basic model for all modifications to be enforced, regardless of the magnitude of the price, because neither 
ex ante incentive effects nor risk are considered. (They briefly consider incentive and risk-bearing problems 
in an extension of their basic model, but not the control of price to alleviate these problems.)  
 
28 Most examples of price regulation that will be noted in section 4 depend only on price, not on 
the contractual situation. However, an example is mentioned of a tow truck rate regulation that applies only 
in emergency circumstances, so this regulation does operate in a way that depends on the contractual 
environment. Even so, this regulation does not function so as to reflect the array of characteristics of the 
contractual context that courts would be likely to consider.  
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For the optimal price to be determined for the purposes of legal intervention, the 
state must in principle take into account the various functional relationships that we have 
discussed: that between contractor effort and the likelihood of finding a victim in a 
situation of need; that between victim effort and the probability of a situation of need 
arising; that between victim investment and the distribution of return. Additionally, the 
state needs to know the harm that might be suffered by the victim in the absence of aid, 
and the cost of giving aid.    
The information of the state will, of course, be imperfect, meaning that practically 
optimal intervention will have to reflect the social costs of mistake in setting prices. A 
major cost of mistake in setting prices is discouragement of the making of desirable new 
contracts. If the price ceiling turns out to be less than the cost of furnishing aid, then a 
contract will not be made, even though the resulting harm to the victim could greatly 
exceed the cost of aid. For example, if the price allowed for rescuing a ship in danger of 
going aground were less than the actual cost to the salvor (suppose there was a risk to the 
salvor, owing to high seas), the salvor would not perform the rescue and the ship might 
be lost.  
Similarly, mistakes in overseeing the terms of modifications of contracts may 
result in undesirable breach. If the price increase permitted by courts for a firm seeking to 
renegotiate a contract in the face of higher costs or unanticipated liquidity problems is not 
sufficient, the firm might breach even though continuing with its performance would be 
better.   
To guard against such costly mistakes, resulting in failure to make desirable 
contracts or in undesirable breach of existing contracts, optimal policy should feature 
“generosity” in price setting and limits on whether there will be legal intervention. 
Because the task that the state must perform in estimating the optimal price is of a 
complex nature – depending as it does on contractual situations that are so various and on 
an inference process using a wide range of very partial information – the task would be 
hard to describe precisely ex ante.
29 If the state’s task is difficult to articulate in an 
explicit manner in advance, it may not be beneficial for parties to make the effort in a 
contract to write down what principles should govern possible contract modification. 
Instead, the parties might be better off allowing the courts to intervene in modifications to 
control price using what are here termed optimal methods, given the courts’ imperfect 
information. Note that if the parties were able to say in advance how modification should 
be governed, then the holdup-related rationale for judicial intervention in modifications 
under discussion in this article would not be valid; for the parties would be able to guide 
their contract modifications themselves.  
A further point should be added, although simple. Namely, judicial intervention to 
control price is expensive for the parties. This reinforces the conclusion that the optimal 
policy will be a generous one as to price and one which constrains the amount of legal 
intervention; for that will reduce the amount of litigation as well as ameliorate the 
chilling of desirable contracts. 
                                                 
29 Consideration of just a few judicial opinions in cases involving the enforceability of contract 
modifications would, I think, be sufficient to convince most readers that it would be realistically impossible 
to set out a clear set of rules that could be followed essentially mechanically that would produce similar 
decisions to the courts’.  
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***   
Let us briefly consider legal intervention in contracts with regard to the two 
models of fresh contracts discussed in the previous section. 
Contractors engineer situations of need.  In this case, we want to verify that if the 
state flatly voids contracts, the first-best outcome will result, that is, contractors will not 
exert effort to engineer situations of need and victims will not exert effort to reduce the 
chance of such situations. This conclusion is evident, since if contracts are voided, 
contractors cannot make profit so will choose y = 0. Hence, p = 0, implying (see (2)) that 
x = 0. 
Note that the state needs no information to implement the voiding policy that 
results in the optimal outcome. This is because a situation of need can only arise if 
contractor effort y is positive. If, however, the model is changed, and it is assumed that 
p(x, 0) > 0, situations of need can arise even if y = 0. Then the policy that results in the 
optimal outcome would be to void contracts whenever y is positive; this would require 
the state to observe y.  
Contractors search for victims in situations of need. Let 
z = regulated contract price, 
where h $  z $ c (for z > h or z < c cannot be optimal, as then contracts for aid would not 
be made). Given z, victims choose x to minimize  
(13)    x + p(x)[q(y)z + (1 – q(y))h] 
and contractors choose y to maximize 
(14)   p(x)q(y)(z – c) – y. 
These two problems implicitly determine x and y as functions of z, so that social costs can 
be written as 
(15)   S(z) = x(z) + y(z) + p(x(z))[q(y(z))c + (1 – q(y(z)))h], 
and let z* be the optimal price, minimizing (15) (we assume uniquely, for simplicity).  
Note that z* leads only to a second-best optimum.
30   
  Now in the absence of legal intervention, the contract price will be z(8) = c +  
8(h – c), which might or might not exceed z*. 
Hence, if the state sets the contract price at z*, then the second-best optimum will 
be achieved regardless of the unconstrained price z(8). Also, when z(8) $ z*, if the state 
employs a contract price ceiling, the second-best optimum will be achieved, whereas if 
contracts are enforced at the unconstrained price z(8), the outcome will be inferior. As 
noted in the text of this section, the price ceiling policy can be implemented in two 
equivalent ways: by altering z(8) to z*, or by voiding any contract in which the price z 
exceeds z*. (Moreover, if the state were to void all contracts, the second-best optimum 
obviously would not be achieved.) 
The determination of z* requires the state to minimize (15), which requires the 
state to know c and h and the functions p(x) and q(y). It would be straightforward to 
introduce into the model uncertainty on the part of the state about the contractual 
environment, by considering distributions of c and h and of parameters identifying the 
functions p(x) and q(y).  
 
                                                 
30 This is clear, since for (7) to be satisfied, z must equal c, whereas for (8) to be satisfied, z must 
equal h.  
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4. Legal Intervention to Remedy Contractual Holdup Problems: In Practice 
  What decisions were reached by courts in the cases mentioned in section 2? In 
Baker v. Morton, the contract for sale of land was canceled. In Beckwith v. Frisbie, the 
price increase agreed to by Beckwith for release of his oats was not enforced, but 
Beckwith did have to pay for the expense Frisbie incurred to store the oats over the 
winter.
31 In Magnolia Petroleum v. National Oil Transport Co., the $15,000 price was 
adjusted to $1,700, which, note, exceeded the $500 to $600 normal daily towing rate. In 
Alaska Packers, the court refused to enforce the agreed modification. In the hypothetical 
example (b) involving the construction company, my suspicion is that the contract 
modification would not be enforced.
32 In the example (c) concerning the electrician and 
the restaurant, my belief is that the price would be adjusted, probably to an amount of at 
most several hundred dollars.
33  
As these legal cases illustrate, courts sometimes do, or sometimes likely would, 
intervene in contracts on grounds of holdup, either to void them or to control the price. 
Let me now summarize how this comes about under contract law and also under 
admiralty law principles. Then I will discuss certain legislation that controls price and 
that also functions to prevent significant holdup. 
 Contract law: duress, good faith, unanticipated circumstances, and 
unconscionability.
34 Courts may intervene in contracts and their modifications on 
grounds of duress.
35 According to the principles of duress, a contract or a modification 
may be voided if it is made as the result of an improper threat, and if the threat left the 
                                                 
31 Frisbie had imposed an extra $25 charge on Beckwith. (Frisbie’s justification was that he was 
not required to give credit of $25 to Beckwith for an earlier payment for that amount that Beckwith made to 
the captain of Frisbie’s boat.) Frisbie also imposed a charge of $46.96 for storage of the oats. The decision 
negated the $25 extra charge but did require Beckwith to pay the storage cost (yet gave him $.75 credit for 
oats eaten by Frisbie’s horses over the winter).  
 
32 On grounds of bad faith, as is about to be discussed.  
 
33 On grounds of duress or unconscionability. 
 
34 For descriptions of contract law in single volume treatises, see Calamari and Perillo (1998) and 
Farnsworth (1999). Two basic sources on contract law are the Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, an 
authoritative summary of the common law of contracts, and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), which has been incorporated by statute into the law in all states other than Louisiana. Article 2 of 
the UCC covers the sale of goods; the definition of goods is such that it covers a broad range of contracts. 
A standard reference on the UCC is White and Summers (2000).   
 
35 See Calamari and Perillo (1998), pp. 308-321, Farnsworth (1999), 264-273, Restatement of 
Contracts 2
nd, §§174-176, UCC §2-209, and White and Summers (2000), pp. 57-60. See also the important 
articles on duress of Dawson (1947) and Hale (1943), and for extensive descriptions of cases on duress, see 
the still relevant articles of Dalzell (1942). It may be noted that the use of duress and related doctrines as 
rationales for intervention in contracts were different in the past: intervention in fresh contracts was less 
frequent; and intervention in modifications was more frequent (indeed, modifications were unlikely to be 
enforced whenever the seller received a higher price for doing what was already his contractual duty). See, 
for example, Farnsworth (1999), pp. 265, 276-283.  
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victim with little alternative.
36 Improper threats include threats of crimes and torts, and 
threats to act in lawful ways but that would violate the general contractual duty of good 
faith and fair dealing;
37 the duty of good faith and fair dealing is given particular 
emphasis in the context of contract modification.
38 The victim’s not having much 
alternative appears to mean that the disutility that he would suffer if the threat were 
carried out would be substantial.
39   
An important factor bearing on the enforceability of contract modifications is 
whether the circumstances that gave rise to a change in a contract were unanticipated and 
provided an economic warrant for the alteration. If these conditions are not satisfied, the 
modification is frequently voided.
40
An additional legal concept affecting judicial intervention in contracts and their 
modifications is unconscionability.
41 Unconscionability can refer to procedural factors 
under which a contract was made – notably, to whether a party was in a circumstance of 
need or was uninformed – or to the substance of a contract – to the deviation of the price 
or other terms from what seems fair in the light of market conditions. Contracts or 
modifications deemed to be unconscionable are generally voided.  
Let me now review certain aspects of the operation of these elements of contract 
law, especially as they relate to whether and, if so, how contract price affects contract 
enforcement and to the possible chilling of contracts.  
For certain types of improper threats, the voiding of contracts or of modifications 
generally does not depend on whether the price was considered unfair or deviant. This is 
true when the threat is to commit a crime or a tort,
42 as in Baker v. Morton, since the 
threat there was murder, and as in Beckwith, since the threat there was to hold onto 
property not one’s own, a tort. Another category of threats tending to result in voiding 
                                                 
36 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §175(1), states “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by 
an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim.”  The meaning of voiding the contract depends on whether property has been 
conveyed or a service has been provided. If the former, the contract can be undone; for example, land 
conveyed by buyer to seller can be returned to the seller and the money paid returned to the buyer. If a 
service has been provided, such as towing a vessel, the contract cannot be literally undone; instead, the 
price paid can be adjusted with the buyer paying the seller a “fair” price determined by the court. See the 
discussion in the text below, and see also Farnsworth (1999), pp. 272-273. 
 
37 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §176, spells out categories of improper threats. On the general 
duty to act in good faith, see Calamari and Perillo (1998), pp. 457-461, Farnsworth (1999), pp. 504-509, 
Restatement of Contracts, 2
nd, §205, and UCC §1-203. 
  
38 Farnsworth (1999), pp. 267-268, 282-283, Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §§89(a), 176, UCC §2-
209, and White and Summers (2000), pp. 57-60. 
 
39 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §175, Comments b and c.  
  
40 Calamari and Perillo (1998), p. 185, Farnsworth (1999), pp. 281-282, Restatement of Contracts, 
2
nd, §89(a), UCC §2-209, and White and Summers (2000), pp. 57-60.  
  
41 Calamari and Perillo (1998), pp. 365-376, Farnsworth (1999), pp. 303-316, Restatement of 
Contracts, 2
nd, §89(a), UCC §2-302, and White and Summers (2000), ch. 4.   
 
42 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §176(1)(a).  
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independent of price is threats that violate the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
43 The 
modification case given in example (b) could be considered to involve such misbehavior, 
since the company chose an unusual method of construction in order to be able to extract 
a price increase from the contract buyer.
44 Alaska Packers could also be viewed as 
violating the duty of good faith, assuming that the crew took advantage of the 
vulnerability of the Alaska Packers Association when no replacement crew could be 
found and when the crew had no reason for seeking an increase.
45 A further example of 
bad faith in a modification is Capps v. Georgia Pacific, in which Capps, a real estate 
broker, was forced to agree to radically reduce the commission owed him when Georgia 
Pacific threatened not to pay, knowing that Capps needed funds immediately to avert a 
mortgage foreclosure on his home.
46  
That agreements resulting from the types of threat just mentioned may be voided 
regardless of price is consistent with the analysis in section 3. One of the points made 
there was that voiding removes the incentive to engineer situations of need and does not 
present a danger of chilling desirable contracts since those situations will not arise if there 
is voiding. The categories of threat under discussion are essentially engineered or at least 
have the characteristic that they would probably not have been made if it had been known 
that the threats would not result in enforceable contracts. The supposition, in other words, 
is that if the Omaha Claims Club knew its contract with Baker would not be enforced, it 
would not have threatened him; that if the crew in Alaska Packers knew its modification 
would not be enforced, it would not have threatened to quit; likewise with Georgia 
Pacific and its threat not to pay Capps, and so forth.
47   
                                                 
43 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §§175, 176(1)(d).   
 
44 Note that the threat in this case is to breach a contract, which is not a crime or a tort. A similar 
example is where a contract buyer A refuses to pay seller B for goods that have been delivered to him 
unless the price is lowered, knowing that B is in urgent need of cash to avoid foreclosure of a mortgage; see 
Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §175, Illustration 7. An additional example of bad faith, of a different nature, 
is where a person A induces another person B to sign a contract by threatening to use his legal right in a 
different matter to attach a shipment of perishable goods of B (such as bananas), even though he could 
attach non-perishables. See §176, Illustration 7. 
 
45 The crew complained about the poor condition of the fishing nets. If true, that would have 
reduced the number of salmon taken and thus the two cents each crew member would obtain per salmon 
which he helped to catch. The court discounted this claim of the crew. 
 
46 253 Or. 248, 453, P.2d 935 (1969). 
 
47 Note that in a case like Capps (unlike Baker v. Morton and the Omaha Claim Club), the view 
that flat voiding would remove the incentive to threaten breach does not follow from the model of an 
engineered situation of need. Georgia Pacific did not cause Capps to face foreclosure on his home; rather 
Georgia Pacific took advantage of this situation and threatened breach. To understand the effect of flat 
voiding in Capps, we need to say why Georgia Pacific would have wanted to make its threat assuming that 
a modification in its contract would be enforced. Presumably it did so in order to obtain a large reduction in 
the real estate commission, and it would not have made the threat had Capps not needed prompt payment so 
strongly, since making such a threat may involve a reputational cost to Georgia Pacific that would exceed 
the modest amount it could extract from Capps in normal circumstances. A related question is why Georgia 
Pacific’s threat was credible to Capps. An answer may lie in the difficulty Capps might have had in proving 
damages and also in the point that, once Georgia Pacific made its threat, it would suffer a reputational loss 
for bargaining weakness if it did not follow through on it. An explanation along these lines would lead to 
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For other types of improper threats, those not crimes or torts or displaying bad 
faith, the voiding of contract or modifications may depend on whether the price was seen 
as unfair.
48 The contract in example (c) involving the electrician might well be voided on 
grounds of unfairness of the price, since the price was $2,000 rather than the usual $80. 
Magnolia Petroleum and many other maritime rescue cases also provide illustrations (as 
will be discussed shortly). Another typical example is Rodziewicz v. Waffco Heavy Duty 
Towing, in which the court stated that a contract for $4,070 for towing a truck that had 
broken down on the highway, and for which the normal charge would be about $275, 
would not be enforceable.
49 A modification example would be a case where a builder 
seeks a modification because his costs unexpectedly rise by $10,000, making the contract 
a losing proposition for him, but due to the great need of the buyer for timely completion, 
the builder is able to obtain a disproportionate modification increase in price of 
$100,000.
50 Although in these examples courts did, or might be predicted to, explicitly 
mention the unfairness of price as a reason for voiding, an exorbitant price can exert 
influence as well by enhancing the willingness of a court to find bad faith or some other 
reason for voiding.  
Cases in which modifications tend to be enforced are, as noted above, those in 
which the price was not seen as unreasonable and in which the circumstances that gave 
rise to a change in a contract affected the party threatening breach, were unanticipated, 
and provided an economic basis for the change. For instance, in Watkins v. Carrig, the 
Watkins firm contracted with Carrig to excavate his cellar for a stated price, but Watkins 
unexpectedly encountered rock, making his task harder to undertake than was foreseen.
51 
Carrig agreed to a price increase that was not found unreasonable in the situation, and the 
modification was enforced. In Goebel v. Linn, brewers agreed to pay more for ice than 
had been originally agreed, $3.50 rather than $2.00, when the ice crop failed due to an 
unexpectedly mild winter and no other suppliers of ice had ice available.
52 Here, the price 
increase was said not to be too much under the circumstances and the modification was 
                                                                                                                                                 
the conclusion that, if Georgia Pacific anticipated its modification would be flatly voided, it would not have 
made its threat in the first place.   
  
48 Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §176(2) states that a necessary condition for certain threats to be 
considered improper is that the “resulting exchange is not on fair terms.”  See also §176 and Comments a 
and e.  Also, §89(a) states that a modification is binding if it is “fair and equitable....” 
 
49 763 N.E. 2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. Ap. 2002). In fact Rodziewicz did not make a contract with 
Waffco for $4,070 – what happened is that Waffco refused to release Rodziewicz’s truck unless he paid 
$4,070 – but the court announced what its decision would have been had there been such a contract. The 
court grounded its decision on unconscionability.  
 
50 An essentially similar example is implicitly furnished by Goebel v. Linn, to be described shortly, 
in which the circumstances of a supplier of ice became more difficult. In this case, the modification was 
enforced, a primary reason being that the price increase for ice was found reasonable (see especially p. 
494); if the price increase had been higher, presumably the decision would have been not to enforce the 
modification.  
  
51 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941).
  
52 47 Mich. 489, 11 N. W. 284 (1882). 
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enforced. In Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, a designer who had contracted to work for 
a wage of $90 a week received another offer for $115 a week. He obtained a modification 
in which his wage was raised to $100, which was enforced, presumably in part because of 
the reasonableness of the wage increase in the circumstances.
53 In The Sopranos matter, a 
suspicion is that the increase in payment obtained by Gandolfini from HBO would be 
upheld if it was not grossly different from what he could obtain from outside offers (and 
apparently it was not), or at least that Gandolfini would have a greater chance of having 
his modification upheld than if he had obtained a much higher increase.
54
That the enforcement versus the voiding of the contracts and modifications in the 
types of cases under discussion depends on the price comports with section 3. For in the 
contexts at issue, it appears to be desirable that fresh contracts be made and that 
contractual relationships be continued, yet not at unreasonable price levels that would 
create substantial problems of holdup. In particular, it is desirable that electricians 
provide services to restaurants so that they can operate on New Year’s eve; that tow 
trucks provide emergency help to truck drivers like Rodziewicz; that contractors like 
Carrig continue their work on basements for individuals like Watkins; that ice companies 
deliver ice to prevent brewers like Linn from losing their stock of beer. These socially 
good things will happen, with prices or modified prices being kept in check, under 
properly applied price-conditioned voiding, since if the allowed prices permit reasonable 
profits, the contracts and modifications will be made, and parties will not agree to higher 
than allowed prices for fear that the victim will later bring suit to have the contract 
voided. In contrast, recall that there is no need for price-constrained voiding in cases like 
Beckwith and Capps; for in such cases flat voiding does not chill desirable contracting.  
A number of observations about the law just reviewed and its economic 
interpretation are worth adding. First, intervention by courts on the basis of price does not 
seem to occur unless the price deviates substantially from the estimated market price. 
This is based on an impression gained from reading cases (for instance, in Rodziewicz the 
$4,070 price for a tow instead of the normal $275 charge was found excessive, but in 
Goebel v. Linn the $3.50 price for ice instead of $2.00 was not) and also on the inference 
that, were courts willing to intervene whenever price deviations are modest, the volume 
of litigation about unfair prices would probably be vast rather then limited in scope as it 
is. If this view that courts’ intervention is conservative in character is correct, it would fit 
with the point of section 3 that a cautious-of-intervention judicial policy may be 
desirable, given the costs of intervention and the danger of discouraging desirable 
contracts.  
                                                 
53 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).  An example of a contrary decision is Davis & Company v. 
Morgan, 117 Ga. 504 (Supreme Ct. of Georgia, 1903), where an employer increased the contract wage in 
response to an employee’s receiving a higher offer from another employer, but the court refused to enforce 
the modification in the wage. Today, however, it seems that enforcement would be more likely; see note 
40. 
 
54 That the $800,000 to $1,000,000 per episode that Gandolfini sought might have approximated 
his alternative market opportunity is suggested by this statement: “Gandolfini currently pulls in $400,000 
per episode and is said to want the big-time money paid to other prime-time stars. (Ray Romano earns 
$800,000 per episode for Everybody Loves Raymond and Kelsey Grammer bags $1.6 million an episode on 
Frasier.)” See E-Online, “HBO Puts Hit on Gandolfini,” March 11, 2003, in 
www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,11420,00.html.
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Second, the latter danger, of chilling desirable contracting, is an issue to which 
courts and commentators sometimes give explicit recognition. For example, in Goebel v. 
Linn, the court stated that it would be strange if the existing contract “could stand in the 
way of a new ... contract which should provide for a price that would enable both parties 
to save their interests.”
55 The court also explained why it might have been in the mutual 
interests of the parties to modify their contract. “Suppose, for example, the defendants 
had satisfied themselves that the ice company under the very extraordinary circumstances 
of the entire failure of the local crop of ice must be ruined if their existing contracts were 
to be insisted upon, and must be utterly unable to respond in damages.... [T]hey must 
either make a new arrangement, or, in insisting on holding the ice company to the 
existing contract, they would ruin the ice company and thereby at the same time ruin 
themselves.”
56 Farnsworth expresses the same point in discussing modification of a 
construction contract.
57 Often, however, courts and commentators do not discuss the 
possibility of the policy of judicial intervention preventing desirable contracting. Kelsey-
Hayes v. Galtaco is a typical example.
58 In this case, Galtaco, a supplier of castings to 
Kelsey-Hayes, threatened to close down its losing foundry operations unless it received 
price increases of 60 per cent. Kelsey-Hayes agreed to this demand because it greatly 
needed the castings; without them, it would not be able to provide certain brake 
assemblies to Ford, and Ford would probably have had to halt production of a vehicle 
line. Although the court engaged in a detailed and careful analysis of the case, it made no 
mention of the effect that its decision not to enforce the modification might have on the 
likelihood of undesirable breach in similar situations in the future. That is, the court wrote 
as if its decision would somehow not cause breach in an identical case in the future; the 
decision would only achieve a more equitable price in the instant case. Yet it seems that 
the court’s decision might cause a breach in a future identical case, since a future Galtaco 
would know that it could not obtain an enforceable 60 per cent price increase. At the 
same time, the court apparently believed that a breach in the instant case would have been 
undesirable, since if Kelsey-Hayes did not get the castings, Kelsey-Hayes would suffer 
greatly and Ford’s production of a vehicle line would be compromised. Thus the court 
may have made a decision that conflicted with its purposes. The lacuna in the court’s 
reasoning in Kelsey-Hayes v. Galtaco, a failure to account for the possibility of chilling 
desirable modifications in the future, is often seen in decisions,
59 and suggests that the 
danger of judicial mistake is not small.  
An additional observation is that courts do not generally intervene in contracts on 
the basis of price alone, but rather intervene owing only to a joint consideration of price 
                                                 
55 See the opinion, p. 493.   
 
56 See the opinion, pp. 492-493.  
 
57 Farnsworth (1999), pp. 280-281.  
 
58 749 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
  
59 See, for example, Leggett v. Vinson, 155 Miss. 411 (1929), in which the court refused to enforce 
a modification of a construction contract that was made when the contractor appeared to have run out of 
funds; the court made no reference to the effect its decision would have on the likelihood of breach in 
similar future cases.  
  
18    
and other circumstances, notably of the victim’s degree of need, whether he was in a 
situation of duress. The economic interpretation of this observation is informational, that 
the price alone does not ordinarily tell courts enough to allow them to make judgments 
about the appropriateness of contracts. When, however, courts know that not only was the 
price seemingly high, but also that the victim was in a situation of duress, the courts have 
in this fact additional evidence giving them reason to think that the apparently high price 
was indeed excessive: for the element of the victim’s need gives the threatener the 
bargaining power to extract a high price.
60 If a court knows that a tug charged a vessel 
that was in distress $2,000 for a short tow when the normal price would be $500, the 
court will reasonably infer that the high price was obtained because the vessel did not 
have the opportunity to search the market for tug services but rather had to deal, on the 
spot, with a single tug. Suppose, in contrast, that a court knows that a tug charged a 
vessel the same price of $2,000, but that the vessel was not in distress. In this case, the 
court may infer that since the vessel presumably did have the time to search the market 
for tug services, the charging of a $2,000 price probably has an explanation involving 
factors affecting cost (perhaps the cargo in the vessel was fragile, so the tow had to be 
done carefully, using special equipment).
61   
Another matter of interest is whether, when courts void a contract, they substitute 
a price they consider fair and, if so, how the new price is determined. In cases where the 
contract that is voided was a new contract and a service was performed, such as that 
involving the electrician or the towing of a vehicle as in Rodziewicz, the party who 
supplied the service is normally compensated for it, at what is estimated by the court to 
be the market rate. This compensation for the service provided often occurs through 
application of a restitutionary remedy. If, however, the new contract that is voided was 
for conveyance of existing goods or property, the transaction can be undone (the goods or 
property can be returned to the seller, and the money paid returned to the buyer), so there 
is no need for the court to determine a substitute price. If what was voided was a 
modification, the usual price that governs is the original contract price, so that, again, the 
court need not, and generally does not, determine a substitute price. Hence, except in the 
first category of cases (fresh contracts involving services), courts do not control price by 
                                                 
60 It is instructive to contrast the general point now being made, that it is rational for courts to 
consider the victim’s situation of duress, to Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2004), who stress on p. 417 that 
“courts should not examine whether the buyer was coerced....” and on p. 392 that modifications should be 
enforced “even if blatantly coercive,” whenever the threat to commit breach is credible. The reason for 
their interesting (and radical) recommendation is that they generally compare the policy of enforcing a 
modification at the agreed price with the policy of flat voiding of the modification, not with the policy of 
price-conditioned voiding. Given the choice that they posit faces the courts, their conclusion is correct: for 
flat voiding would lead to breach, to the mutual detriment of the parties, presuming the threat to breach was 
credible. But if courts can pursue a policy of price-conditioned voiding, the courts can lower the price 
without causing breach. Hence, the situation of the victim of the threat becomes relevant, for as explained 
here, the situation tells the court when the price was likely to have been high in comparison to that needed 
to avoid breach.   
  
61 A reason not discussed in this paragraph why duress may be relevant, in combination with price, 
concerns risk aversion. If a person in duress is in a bad financial situation (such as that he is desperate for 
funds to avoid foreclosure, as in Capps), then it is more important to give him the insurance provided by 
judicial oversight of the price than otherwise. 
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providing a substitute price. Rather, the control of price, comes about because the voiding 
is conditioned on price – the parties know that if the price is too deviant, their contract or 
modification will not be enforced – or else because there is flat voiding (when threats are 
engineered or represent violations of the duty of good faith).   
Admiralty law: salvage contracts. In cases involving contracts for salvage, 
admiralty law principles guide courts.
62 According to these principles, contracts made 
when vessels are in great danger are subject to careful judicial scrutiny, and if prices are 
excessive, they are reduced to a fair level. Magnolia Petroleum is illustrative because the 
barge that was towed was in great danger and the $15,000 contract price was a large 
multiple of the fair price. To determine the fair price in that case, the court took into 
consideration that the seas were not dangerous and that the tow was routine, so it used as 
its benchmark the normal towing rate of $500 to $600 a day. The actual way that the 
court calculated the award was generous: it employed $700 as the daily rate, it next 
doubled this amount to obtain $1,400, and it then added another $300 for the several 
hours beyond one day that the tugboat spent, mainly preparing for the tow. Two other 
cases are useful to mention. In Post v. Jones, a whaling vessel, the Richmond, went 
aground near the Behring Strait a short time before winter ice would freeze her in.
63 The 
Richmond’s crew was rescued at little cost by other whalers fishing in the waters, the 
whale oil aboard her was transferred to these vessels, but the price they paid for the oil 
was small compared to its value. The court did not enforce the low contract price and 
stated that the Richmond should instead receive an amount for its oil based on the market 
price, after allocating a fraction of the oil to the salvors and giving them credit for freight. 
In The Elfrida, a ship went aground near the mouth of the Brazos River in Texas.
64 The 
Elfrida was not subject to an imminent risk but would have been vulnerable to loss if not 
released before a heavy storm came on. The Elfrida considered several bids from salvors 
for her refloating before accepting one, nine days after the grounding, for $22,000, to be 
paid only upon success; the value of the ship was about four times this amount. The court 
enforced the contract at the agreed price, emphasizing that the contract was made with 
deliberation, when the Elfrida was not in immediate peril, and that the salvor’s 
compensation was not assured because refloating her might not have been easy. 
These cases help to illustrate not only the general point that the contract price may 
be replaced with a fair price when a vessel or her contents was at immediate and 
substantial risk – as in Magnolia Petroleum and Post v. Jones – but also the converse 
point that when a vessel is not in real jeopardy, the courts are less likely to intervene – as 
they refrained from doing in The Elfrida.
65 The cases also exemplify the principles used 
to determine the fair price. According to these principles, the fair price is supposed to 
reflect the time, expenses, and risks faced by the rescuing vessel, whether this vessel was 
                                                 
62 See generally Brice (2003), and ch. 5 on contracts for salvage; Gilmore and Black (1975), and 
§8-15 on contracts for salvage; and Norris (2003), and ch. 12 on contracts for salvage.  
  
63 60 U.S. 150, 19 How. 150 (1856).
  
64 172 U.S. 186, 19 S.Ct. 146 (1898).
 
65 In the opinion in The Elfrida, the court stated on p. 206 that “Had the agreement been made with 
less deliberation or pending a peril more imminent, our conclusion might have been different.”  
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a professional salvor (in which case courts tend to be more liberal), and the value and the 
risk faced by the vessel in distress.
66 In keeping with these principles, the court noted in 
Magnolia Petroleum and in Post v. Jones that there was no risk of failure or risk to the 
rescuing vessel, and hence no reason to increase the fair price on those accounts, whereas 
in The Elfrida the court stated that the risk of not succeeding in rescue did justify a higher 
price. Observe also that whether the rescuing vessel was a professional salvor is reflected 
by the generosity of the courts in calculating the price in Magnolia Petroleum (where, 
recall, the normal towage rate was more than doubled) and in The Elfrida. The value and 
risk faced by the vessel in distress was also taken into account by the court in the 
consideration of price in The Elfrida. 
 The economic interpretation of what has just been reviewed in the light of our 
analysis of holdup is as follows.
67 First, it makes obvious sense that the law should draw 
the distinction that it does between cases where vessels are in immediate peril and where 
they are not, since holdup is much more likely to be a problem when the peril is 
imminent. In the circumstances of Magnolia Petroleum and Post v. Jones, the vessels in 
distress did not have the ability or time to obtain bids for rescue and faced large expected 
losses, so were in classic bilateral monopoly situations. In The Elfrida, in contrast, the 
danger was not immediate and the ship was able to solicit and did consider different bids 
for refloating.  
Second, the elements of the calculation of the fair price are economically rational 
in that they are likely to produce prices that would be sufficient to encourage contracting 
while preventing holdup prices. In particular, the time, expenses, and risk faced by the 
rescuing vessel need to be taken into account to generate a price acceptable to that vessel 
for contracting. The attention given by admiralty law to the value of the vessel in 
jeopardy also reflects economic logic, because of the beneficial incentives that are 
engendered if payments to rescuers depend on the value of the vessel and on success in 
rescue.
68 The relevance of whether the rescuing vessel was a professional salvor makes 
sense, since it is desirable for professional salvors to obtain higher prices (exceeding the 
marginal cost of rescue) to encourage them to remain in business and to invest in salvage 
equipment.
69 Additionally, it may well be that the generosity of the courts in calculating a 
fair price, such as in Magnolia Petroleum, is motivated in part by a desire to avoid 
                                                 
66 See, for example, Norris (2003), ch. 12, §§ 164, 170 on the general factors determining a fair 
price, and ch. 6, §81, on the liberal compensation of professional salvors.  
  
67 The general thrust of what follows is similar to that in Landes and Posner (1978), pp. 101-104; 
see also Buckley (1990), pp. 46-47, and Trebilcock (1995), pp. 87-90. . 
 
68 Awards for salvage, and contracts for salvage, are almost universally made only if the salvage 
effort was successful – on a “no cure, no pay” basis. See, for example, Gilmore and Black (1975), p. 535, 
and Norris (2003), ch. 7. (Presumably, the reason for the no cure no pay regime is that a contrary regime, 
under which a salvor is paid regardless of success, would be unworkable: salvors would be tempted to 
shirk, and it would be difficult to prove whether or not their effort was inadequate.) Given the no cure no 
pay regime, the salvor’s incentives to succeed are obviously improved, to the mutual benefit of the salvor 
and the vessel in need, if the payment to the salvor is greater the higher is the value of the vessel in need.   
 
69 This is also seen as the purpose of liberality in awards to professional salvors by courts; see 
Norris (2003), ch. 6, §81. 
 
21    
chilling desirable contracts due to imperfect information about the minimum price 
necessary to induce contracting.   
 Legislation controlling price. Statutes regulating price may have a limiting effect 
on the possibilities for holdup, as a number of examples illustrate.
70   
Many localities have imposed ceilings on prices that can be charged for towing 
disabled vehicles.
71 This price regulation obviously restricts the possibilities for holdup, 
and that is seen as one of its purposes. For instance, in reviewing tow truck regulations, a 
New York court stated that “an accident is ...  no place for bargaining as to rates of 
charge. Clearly, the motoring public is at a disadvantage in such circumstances and it is 
then that the unscrupulous take unfair advantage.” At the same time, this court did not 
endorse price regulation for towing in non-emergency situations or for repair or storage, 
contexts in which holdup is presumably not much of a problem.
72  
Another example of maximum price regulation is that which requires hotels to 
post their undiscounted room rates.
73 This regulation prevents hotels from engaging in 
classic holdup, for instance, raising their rates excessively on the spot for a person who 
comes in at a late hour and appears to strongly need a room.  
An additional example, of significant historical importance as a form of maximum 
price regulation in Europe throughout the Middle Ages, concerns the principle of laesio 
enormis, holding that if a price in a contract or exchange exceeded 150% of the “just 
price,” the agreed price would be voided and the just price substituted.
74 The just price 
was taken to be essentially the general market-determined price.
75 Hence, the principle of 
laesio enormis functioned to prevent holdup, and this was intended. Scholars of just price 
                                                 
70 Numerous other examples could be supplied. One that I omit is utility price regulation, which 
Goldberg (1976) explains can be viewed as protecting consumers and suppliers against holdup by each 
other. 
  
71 See, for instance, NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-509, stating that “charges for the 
towing of vehicles shall not exceed fifty dollars for the first mile or fraction thereof and four dollars for 
each additional mile or fraction thereof...,” or PHILA., PA., CITY CODE § 9-605(6)(a), stating that “The 
maximum fee a tower may charge for towing a disabled vehicle is forty (40) dollars, and two (2) dollars per 
mile during normal work hours of 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and fifty (50) dollars and two (2) dollars per mile 
for evenings, weekends and holidays...” I owe the example of the towing of disabled vehicles to Daniel 
Kelly, who wrote an excellent student paper about it. 
  
72 Richard’s Serv. Station, Inc. v. Huntington, 361 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1974), modified on other 
grounds, 367 N.Y.S. 2d 296 (2d Dep't 1974).  The court also observed that “Tow truck operators are not 
regulated as to rates in non-emergency situations....”  
  
73 See, for example, Cal. Civ. Code § 1863 (2004), Fla. Stat. § 509.201 (2004), N.Y. C.L.S. Gen. 
Bus. § 206 (2004), and Tex. Occ. Code § 2155.001 (2004). 
 
74 See Baldwin (1959), Dawson (1937), pp. 365-370, de Roover (1958), and Gilchrist (1969), pp. 
58-62. The principle of laesio enormis originally protected only sellers of land from receiving less than half 
its market value but was generalized over the course of time; see especially Baldwin (1959).  
  
75 The view that the just price was instead the fair price, primarily reflecting embedded labor, was 
refuted in the monograph by Baldwin (1959), which has generally been accepted by scholars as 
authoritative; de Roover (1958) is in the same vein.   
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state that an opinion of the times was that sellers should not be able to take advantage of a 
buyer’s special need.
76  
It seems, then, that preventing holdup has been a rationale of many regulations 
that place upper limits on price. However, it should be noted that such regulations 
presumably have another function as well, namely, preventing those who are ignorant of 
the market price from being charged too high a price.     
Two more examples of price regulation will be mentioned, which are different 
from the preceding because they effectively set prices rather than only limit prices. The 
first concerns taxi rates, which are usually mandated.
77 Hence, taxi drivers do not have 
the discretion to engage in holdup, such as of a person who urgently needs to be taken to 
the hospital. Although it is desirable that taxi drivers be prevented from holding up 
customers who have pressing needs for a ride, the regulation of taxi rates is of course 
undesirable because it interferes with the classic allocative function of market prices.
78 It 
would seem preferable, for instance, to allow taxi rates to rise when bad weather or 
convention business increases the overall demand for taxis, leading to the unavailability 
of taxis at the controlled rates. If flexibility in taxi rates could be effected without giving 
too much discretion to raise rates to individual drivers, rates could vary with market 
conditions but holdup of particular individuals could still be curtailed.  
The other example is of statutes that prevent prices from increasing in the 
aftermath of emergencies. Florida, for instance, passed legislation following Hurricane 
Andrew prohibiting the charging of “excessive” prices during a declared state of 
emergency, and other states have enacted similar legislation.
79 The Florida legislation 
stipulates that prices not deviate substantially from the average price in the month 
immediately prior to the declared emergency.
80 The legislation was recently applied, after 
                                                 
76 For example, Baldwin (1959), p. 33, notes that “Sellers ... qualified for ... protections...when 
they could demonstrate unusual distress in their situations.” De Roover (1958), p. 426, described the views 
of an influential fifteenth century commentator, San Bernardino of Siena, in this way: “[N]o one is allowed 
... to take advantage of a buyer’s ...special need.” Gilchrist (1969), p. 61, writes “The unjust price took 
advantage of some ‘weakness’ or necessity on the part of the buyer or seller....”   
  
77 These may be found on the websites of many cities.  For example, for Boston, see 
www.ci.boston.ma.us/transporation/cabs.asp; for Chicago, see http://egov.cityofchicago.org, and navigate 
to “Liveries and Taxis”; for New York City, see 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/taxicab_rate.shtml. The only variation in rates seems to be 
according to the time of day. For instance, in New York City rates involve a $1.00 surcharge Monday 
through Friday from 4:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. and an evening surcharge of $.50 after 8:00 P.M. 
  
78 The control of prices is also undesirable due to the fact the supply-related function of price. I am 
here, though, assuming that the quantity of taxis is regulated, and discussing allowing the rate to vary to 
clear the market given the quantity of taxis. 
  
79 See Fla. Stat. § 501.160 (2003) and, for example, Ark. Code § 4-88-303 (2003), Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 42-230 (2003), and N.J. Stat. § 56:8-109 (2004).  Emergency price regulations are also sometimes 
adopted in wartime.  During World War II, the United States enacted the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942, about which much of what will be said here would apply. 
  
80 The deviation that would result in a sanction is not defined numerically under the Florida 
legislation, but it is in some other states.  For example, in Arkansas, a deviation would be sanctioned if it 
exceeded by 10% the average price in the previous month. 
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Florida was struck by hurricanes over the summer of 2004, to stem what was described as 
gouging by sellers of many products and services, for instance, for gasoline, generators, 
pumps, chain saws, and hotel rooms.
81 This regulation prevents holdup of single 
individuals due to their particular circumstances, such as a motorist who runs out of gas 
as he pulls up to a gas station or a person who urgently needs a pump to prevent flooding 
that would destroy valuable property. But the regulation obviously suffers from the 
problem that it compromises the general allocative and production-related social 
advantages of allowing price to respond to changes in overall demand and supply 
conditions. If, following a Florida hurricane (causing an increase in demand and a 
reduction in supply of many goods and services), the price of gasoline rises from $1.78 
per gallon to a new market level of $3.00 per gallon, the allocation of gasoline will be 
improved because only those individuals who place a relatively high value on gasoline 
will purchase it (such as hospital workers). When gasoline prices are controlled, however, 
gasoline stocks will be exhausted (as happened at many gas stations in Florida
82), so that 
individuals who were not lucky enough to have purchased it cannot do so, no matter how 
much they would value it. Regarding supply effects, one might imagine that, if gasoline 
prices were permitted to rise in Florida, more gasoline would have been trucked in from 
Georgia, and so forth. These textbook effects of emergency price controls seem to have 
been overlooked by the authors of the regulation. A motivation for the regulation appears 
to be to help the mass of individuals from having to pay higher prices after an 
emergency.
83 This motivation is different from, and should not be conflated with, the 
objective of preventing holdup of single individuals whose demand for a good or a 
service is much greater than that of the mass of individuals.  
 
5. Discussion 
  I remark here on a number of issues relating prevention of holdup as a rationale 
for legal intervention in contracts to economic theory and to recent literature on 
contracting. 
  Prevention of holdup as a major justification for legal intervention in contracts. 
There are two standard reasons for legal intervention in contracts. One is that a party to a 
contract may lack information about the good or service in question. This possibility 
could justify voiding contracts (as for fraud) or such policies as required disclosure or 
minimum product quality constraints. The other basic reason for legal intervention in 
contracts concerns externalities. Notably, if contracts would generate negative 
externalities, that could call for their cancellation, taxation, or limitation.  
                                                 
81 For example “Price gouging in Florida: 10,000 to remove a tree,” by Joseph B. Treaster, The 
New York Times, August 18, 2004, reported prices of $3.00 per gallon of gasoline instead of the prior price 
of $1.78, $2,000 for a generator instead of $250, $109 for a room at a motel instead of $39.99. The story 
also mentioned a man with a chain saw who offered to clear an oak tree from a person’s roof for $10,500. 
  
82 See “Price Gouging Saves Lives” by David M. Brown, August 17, 2004, at 
dmb1000@juno.com.  
  
83 If it were thought that the implicit insurance benefit of holding down prices outweighed the 
losses due to interference with the allocative and productive effects of permitting a price rise, the regulation 
might be defended.  
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To these broad justifications for legal intervention in contracts, it seems that 
prevention of holdup ought to be added, in the light of sections 3 and 4. Holdup, note, is a 
problem that is independent of lack of information and externalities. (The problem faced 
by a ship in distress need not involve any informational asymmetry between the ship and 
her rescuer nor any externality.) Moreover, the problem of holdup seems to be of 
sufficient empirical importance (consider the significance of modification of contracts) to 
justify its being added to the two standard rationales.   
Although problems of holdup are common, they warrant legal intervention in 
contracts only in a restricted class of situations. On reflection, the problems associated 
with holdup pertain to some degree to virtually all contracts made in contexts possessing 
an element of bilateral monopoly. Consider, for instance, even such a mundane 
transaction as the sale of a piano by a person who plans to move to another city in a 
month. That this person might be under some pressure to sell could allow a buyer to 
obtain a favorable price. And the prospect of having to sell his piano at a relatively low 
price might lead to inefficient behavior, for instance, his spending to transport the piano 
to the other city when it would be socially better for him to purchase a replacement piano 
there. But the notion that judicial intervention in contracts to sell pianos when people 
have to move to another city in a month would be socially desirable is not appealing. The 
problems of holdup for such transactions seem modest or less than that, and the 
information courts would need to be able to justify voiding these contracts on the basis of 
price very likely exceeds that which the courts possess. It appears that legal intervention 
is defensible only in quite different circumstances, only when holdup problems exceed a 
fairly pronounced threshold of substantiality, when courts have sufficient information to 
determine a useful remedy. This view comports with reality in that, as has been described 
here, legal intervention does seem restricted to circumstances of significant holdup.  
Holdup (and the related need for legal intervention in contracts) may be viewed 
as a consequence of parties’ inability to contract at an earlier time. Holdup in the 
making of fresh contracts and the problems associated with it would not arise if the 
victims and the beneficiaries of holdup were able to meet and contract at an earlier time, 
before situations of need might eventuate. If, for example, ships that might need rescue 
were to contract at the beginning of the year with professional salvors who might give 
aid, it would be in their mutual interest to stipulate reasonable prices for aid (or to arrange 
prepayment) in order to eliminate the costs and the risk that would otherwise be induced 
by the anticipation of holdup. Such contracting is usually impractical, though, because 
there are so many parties who would have to be involved in the ex ante contracts. Hence, 
one might view the problem of contractual holdup and the possible desirability of legal 
intervention in fresh contracts as a byproduct of the inability of parties to contract at a 
prior time.
84   
This point is illustrated in a converse way by an example in which parties are able 
to contract ex ante, before holdup might occur, and where they do thereby prevent 
subsequent holdup. The example, as mentioned in the introduction, is that of the 
                                                 
84 This point obviously does not apply to holdup in the context of modification of a contract, for 
the initial contract is a contract that was made prior to the time of holdup. But one can view the holdup 
problem in the modification context analogously, as flowing from the inability to make a complete initial 
contract.  
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American Automobile Association (AAA) as it relates to towing service. Members of the 
AAA avoid holdup when they need towing service because the AAA contracts with tow 
truck companies across the country to provide tows to its members.
85 In effect, via the 
medium of the AAA, drivers and tow truck companies contract ex ante to avoid the 
holdup problem. Thus, in the case of tow truck service, we can see ex ante contracting as 
well as contract law and maximum price regulation at work to control the holdup 
problem. 
Holdup in the economics contracting literature. Holdup is emphasized in two 
general respects in the contracting literature of economics.
86 First, prevention of holdup is 
viewed as a raison d’être for contracting. Notably, by contracting and specifying price, 
parties can avoid the problem of subsequent holdup and dilution of incentives to invest.
87 
If a nightclub owner advertises the appearance of a singer at his establishment but does 
not have a contract with the singer, she can charge through the nose after he advertises 
and thus appropriate part of the value of the advertising. That would inefficiently dull the 
incentive to advertise, but can be avoided by making a contract in which the price is set in 
advance. This explanation for contracting is essentially the same as the justification for 
legal intervention in fresh contracts discussed here, since legal intervention can be seen as 
an attempt to control the price in the manner the parties might have specified in an earlier 
hypothetical contract.   
Second, and related, because contracts are incomplete and will often be 
renegotiated as a consequence, price is in reality frequently not effectively set, so that the 
problem of holdup reemerges when contracts are modified.
88 This modification holdup 
problem can sometimes be alleviated or cured by the use of mechanisms to guide 
modification
89 or, in a different vein, by the integration of the contracting parties’ 
activities into a firm.
90 Legal intervention to prevent holdup in modifications, such as is 
                                                 
85 As described at www.aaa.com, if an AAA member needs roadside assistance, he or she must 
call one of the 13,000 garages under contract with the AAA. The service provider from such a garage will 
then attempt to remedy the problem (for instance, by changing a flat tire) without a fee (except that up to 
$50 may be charged for lockout and key-related difficulties). If the car is still not functional, a free tow to 
the service provider’s garage or the nearest AAA garage is provided at no cost. The AAA member may also 
elect to have the car towed to a different destination, in which case, in New England, the member will not 
be charged for the first three miles, and will only be charged a fixed rate of $3 per mile after the third mile 
(the number of free miles and the rate applied thereafter may vary according to the region of the country).    
 
86 As indicated earlier, by the contracting literature of economics, I mean the literature in 
mainstream economics journals, not the “law and economics” literature published mainly in special 
purpose law and economics journals and in law reviews.  
 
87 For early formalizations of holdup and dilution of incentives, see Grout (1984) and Rogerson 
(1984). 
  
88 For general treatments, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), chs. 11 and 12, and Hart (1995); 
and see the model of contracts introduced in Hart and Moore (1988).  
  
89 See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), ch. 12, and, for example, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 
(1994), Che and Hausch (1999), Chung (1991), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Nöldeke and Schmidt 
(1995), Schwartz and Watson (2004), and Tirole (1999).  
 
90 See Grossman and Hart (1986), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), and Williamson (1985).  
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discussed in this article, has not been examined to my knowledge in the economics 
contracting literature. One reason is that it has been assumed in most models that the 
courts have very little information about the contractual environment and outcomes, so 
that they would not be able to intervene beneficially. 
Legal enforcement of modifications and of mechanisms that would govern 
renegotiation.  Several comments about the operation of the legal system bear on the 
economics contracting literature on modification. The first comment is simply that the 
law does not necessarily enforce modifications, as has, of course, been one of the themes 
of section 4, whereas in the contracting literature it is generally assumed that the law 
routinely enforces modifications. 
The second comment is that it appears possible that contractually-specified 
mechanisms that would guide renegotiation as discussed in the contracting literature 
could be made enforceable. To amplify, parties might be able to have a named 
mechanism enforced by the law if they specify that a named arbitrator, rather than the 
court, is to implement the mechanism. The legal system is generally bound to enforce 
decisions of arbitrators, whether or not those decisions conform with the contract law that 
would be applied by the courts.
91 However, the question may be asked whether courts, as 
opposed to arbitrators, would enforce a contractually specified mechanism. The answer is 
probably not. Courts apparently will not enforce a clause barring modification of a 
contract and hence, by extension, might not enforce a clause that would bar changing the 
renegotiation process giving rise to a modification.
92  
Actual use of mechanisms to control renegotiation. Examples of contractually 
specified mechanisms that would control renegotiation seem to be unusual. One of the 
few of which I am aware is a clause that parties sometimes employ in construction 
contracts stating that if, due to an unanticipated circumstance, the parties want to make a 
change and cannot agree on a new price, the price adjustment should equal the cost 
difference due to the change plus an allowance for reasonable profit.
93 However, I have 
not encountered any reference to contractual provisions that would guide or constrain 
modification in the many cases concerning modification that I have read or in legal 
                                                 
91 See Goldberg, et al. (1992), pp. 201-202, stating that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)  
generally displaces state law, that the FAA and the Uniform Arbitration Act (which has been adopted in 
almost every state) vest courts with jurisdiction to enforce arbitration decisions, that a court may deny 
enforcement of an arbitration decision only under restrictive circumstances, and citing affirming decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Still, it might be that the FAA would be held not to apply to contracts barring 
modifications (perhaps on the ground that parties are free to rescind their agreement calling for arbitration 
and no modifications) – thus the use of “might” in the previous sentence in text. 
 
92 The Restatement of Contracts 2
nd, §311, Comment a, states “The parties to a contract cannot by 
agreement preclude themselves from varying their duties to each other by subsequent agreement.” Also, in 
in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378, (1919), the court said “Those who 
make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which forbids a change, may be changed like any other.” This 
point is stressed by Jolls (1997).   
 
93 This example is described in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), p.391, which refers to American 
Institute of Architects (AIA) document A201. Not surprisingly, it seems designed to prevent substantial 
holdup. 
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commentary.
94 If this preliminary observation about the rarity of use of modification-
governing mechanisms in contractual practice is borne out by empirical investigation, it 
will call for explanation. A possible avenue is that, as suggested in section 3, it would be 
costly or difficult for parties to describe in advance how modifications should be 
regulated and that the policing of modifications accomplished by courts is tolerably good.  
 
  
                                                 
94 In a similar vein, Davis (2005), p. 3, states that he is unaware of a single reported American or 
English case in which a court has been asked to enforce a written anti-modification clause in a contract. 
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